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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. A. :MENLOVE, for himself and 
as · President of S A L T L A K E 
COUNTY MOTEL ASSOCIA-
TION, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, through 
its Commissioners, 'VILLIAl\1 G. No. 
LARSON, MARVIN G. JENSON 10564 
and JOHN P. CREER; and UTAH 
STATE TAX COMJ\1ISSION, 
through its Commissioners, DON-
ALD T. ADAl\iS, ORVILLE 
GUNTHER, A. PRATT KES-
LER, and RANSO.M QUINN, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENf 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Salt Lake County, the respondent, seeks the affirm-
ance of the judgment of the District Court and costs on 
appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to the provisions of 17-31-1 through 17-
31-7 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Salt Lake County 
passed, on July 27, 1965, an ordinance entitled the 
"Transient Room Tax Ordinance" hereinafter referred 
to as "Ordinance". 
The provisions of the sections cited in the above para-
graph authorized county commissions to establish and 
promote recreational, tourist and convention promotion 
bureaus financed by the imposition of a transient room 
tax not to exceed "one and one-half per cent of the rent 
for every occupancy of a suite, room or rooms." Sub-
ject to assessment were all "persons, companies, corpo-
rations, or other like and similar persons, groups or or-
ganizations doing business as motor courts, motels, 
hotels, inns or like and similar public accommodations." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The "Ordinance" provided for State Tax Com· 
mission assumption of administrative and collection 
responsibilities according to the provisions of Chapter 
9, Title 11, U.C.A. 1953, relating to sales and use taxes. 
On August 2, 1965, appellants filed an action in 
Third District Court seeking to restrain enforcement 
of the "Ordinance" pending a ruling on its constitu· 
tionality. Respondents made a motion for a dismissal 
which was argued and denied without prejudice, filed 
an answer, and, subsequently, moved for a summary 
judgment asserting the absence of any material ques· 
2 
tion of fact and alleging all controverted matters to 
he matters of law. The motion for summary judg-
ment having been argued and Salt Lake County having 
~ubmitted a brief in support of its contentions, judg-
ment was granted by Judge Stewart M. Hanson in 
a memorandum decision dated January 18, 1966. 
From this decision, appellants appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT 
~RR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
II. ALL SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS IN 
CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
DECIDED BY THIS AND OTHER COURTS 
IN RESPONDENTS' FAVOR. 
Ill. APPELLANT LACKS STANDING 
TO RAISE TIIE ISSUES URGED ON AP-
PEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
NO. I. THE LO\VER COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' .MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In Howe vs. State Tax Commission, 10 U. 2d 362, 
3G3, P.2d 468, and cases there cited, this Court accepted 
3 
as a guiding principle when legislation was attacked 
on constitutional grounds, the proposition that all 
doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
Appellant argues that the District Court in grant-
ing a summary judgment for Salt Lake County, de-
prived him of the "right to offer evidence in support 
of the allegations in his pleadings". Appellant's 
Brief, p. 12). It is apparent that the matters in issue 
were heard by the Court at the time of the Motion to 
Dismiss and, subsequently, upon the hearing of re-
spondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.Appellant's 
contention, if permitted literal application, would sub-
ject the Lower Court to the onerous task of hearing 
evidence on every matter, however questionable, when 
pleadings call the constitutionality of legislation in 
question. 
The mere allegation of the constitutional infirmity 
of legislation is not enough to require the Court to hear 
more detailed evidence than was offered in this matter. 
A constitutional question does not arise merely because 
it is raised and a decision is sought. Murie vs. Cavalier 
County, 68 ND 242, 278 NW 243. 
The Howe case (supra) presented this Court alle· 
gations of error similar to those raised by appellant 
under appellant's Point Number Three. In "Howe," 
the Lower Court, after hearing arguments and per· 
mitting the submission of brief, granted the State Tax 
Commission's motion for a dismissal on the ground that 
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
4' 
eould be granted. The allegation was made on appeal 
that such action deprived appellant of a right to be 
heard. This Court, disregarding the allegation of error, 
found for the Tax Commission, affirming the summary 
procedure of the District Court. 
NO. II. ALL SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS IN 
CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
DECIDED BY THIS AND OTHER COURTS 
IN RESPONDENT'S' FAVOR. 
Appellant's brief disinters arguments similar to 
those heard by this Court and laid to rest in the matter 
of Howe vs. State Tax Commission, IO Ut. 2d 362, 
353 P 2d 468, in which case counsel for the present 
appellant, Mr. Maw, represented the Utah State Motel 
Association. 
Appellants argue that the classification for tax-
ation of "transients", defined by the "Ordinance" as 
"any person who occupies any suite, room or rooms 
in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn or similar public 
accommodation for fewer than thirty consecutive days" 
is "discriminatory, unreasonable and unrealistic" since 
it requires taxation of some and exempts from taxation 
other parties of the same class. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 8). In the "Howe" case the argument was that 
the ordinance did not specifically mention apartments, 
rooming houses, and private residences, and, hence, 
since the other short period rentals were specifically 
covered, did not apply equally to all those within the 
same class. The similarity in approach of the two argu-
ments is readily apparent. 
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The Lower Court in its Memorandum Decision 
specifically mentioned the "Howe" case, and no doubt 
concluded that the classification was reasonable based 
upon the following language in that case: 
"The legislative purpose appears to have been to 
impose a tax on charges made for lodgings of the short 
period or stopover type traditionally provided by inns 
or hotels, as distinguished from lodgings for longer 
periods, which assume the character of residence. The 
thirty-day limitation in our statute seems to be a rea-
sonable time break off point for classification of the two 
classes of tenants." (Emphasis added). 
In Gauldin VlJ. Kirk, (Fla.) 47 So.2d 567, the 
reasonableness of the classification between transients 
and permanent guests or tenants is discussed at length. 
Transients were, in the Florida legislation, acknow-
ledged to be parties remaining in premises for less than 
six months. The Florida Supreme Court held: "The 
six months' basis of differentiation is reasonable and 
does not amount to unjust or arbitrary discrimination." 
Appellants have cited no authority which would 
suggest that legislation has been held unconstitutional 
by reason of the clasification between transients and 
and others although at the time the "Howe" case was 
argued at least eight states (Respondents' Brief, Howe 
vs. State Tax Commission, 9201, P. 8) had legislation 
similar to that of the "Transient Room Tax Ordi· 
nance." The Florida and Arizona legislation has 
survived constitutional challenges. See: White vs. 
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Moore, 46 Ariz 48, P 2d 1077; Gauldin vs. Kirk!(Fla) 
47 So.2d 567. 
Appellant argues that the ordinance is unconsti-
tutional because some transients may stay in Salt Lake 
County more than thirty days but change accommoda-
tions several times while others may stay in one place. 
In this event, it is asserted, some members of the same 
class could conceivably be taxed while others similarly 
situated would be exempt. The argument runs that 
this would constitute discrimination invalidating the 
legislation on constitutional grounds. 
It is hard to imagine a law so neatly drafted as 
not to permit speculation as to its undesirable theo-
retical consequences given a certain set of facts. One 
cannot, however, in order to defeat a law, invoke an 
apprehension of what might be done under it. Lehan 
vs. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 61 L.ed. 145, 37 S. Ct. 70. 
The power of courts to pass upon the constitutionality 
of statutes arises only when the interests of litigants 
require the use of this judicial authority for their pro-
tection against actual interference; a hypothetical 
threat is not enough. United Public Workers vs. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 L.Ed 754, 67 S. Ct. 556. One can 
not assert theoretical inequalities in a statute when he 
is not affected by the discrimination which he alleges 
exists. Begay vs. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P. 2d 624. 
Appellants contend that the "Ordinance", since it 
purports to tax the occupants and not the owners of 
accommodations, is a constitutionally prohibited "classi-
7 
fication of persons" for taxation purposes and not a 
classification of property. 
It is interesting to note that the brief in the "Howe" 
case discussed the nature of the type of tax here imposed 
in different terms. (Appellant's Brief, Howe vs. Tax 
Commission, 9201, pages II and 12) White vs. Moore, 
46 Ariz. 48, 46 P.2d 1077, is there cited as being an 
example of a case where a state Supreme Court "passed 
upon the constitutionality of sales tax laws on rentals". 
The holding is recited in the brief as fallows: 
"It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax 
is not a tax on property but a tax on the right 
to enyage in business and that the legislature 
may impose it on any class or classes of business 
it cares to and decline to apply it to others, its 
only limitation in this respect being that the 
classification it makes must be reasonable not 
arbitrary or discriminating and such that all ' 
those falling within the same class will be treated 
alike." (Emphasis added) . 
The Utah State .Motel Association and the present 
appellant's counsel were of the opinion on that occasion 
that the above recital was a "correct statement of law". 
Whether the tax is characterized as a simple tax 
upon the occupancy of short term rental premises or 
a so-called privilege tax on the right to engage in busi- , 
ness which is paid by the occupant, a notion given some 
credence by the wording of the "Ordinance" itself, it 
seems inappropriately characterized as a constitutionally 
invalid tax on individuals. 
8 
The arguments raised on appeal are in effect a 
rehash of those raised against the original imposition 
uf the sales tax on short term rental properties and 
refiect a wishful sentimentality on the part of appel-
lants that the entire matter be re-considered. Logically, 
most if not all of the arguments advanced are equally 
applicable to the entire sales tax on short term rentals 
and not merely to the one and one-half per cent assess-
ment provided for by the present "Ordinance". It is 
respondent's contention that the matter was satisfac-
torily resolved by a unanimous Supreme Court in the 
''1/ owe" case; that appellants' arguments are mere vari-
ati(ms of those previously advanced, the appeal present-
ing substantially identical parties and issues. 
NO. Ill. APPELLANT LACKS STANDING 
TO RAISE THE ISSUES URGED ON AP-
PEAL. 
l\!Ienlove, the motel operator, brought this action 
"for himself and as President of Salt Lake County 
Motel Association." 
The "Transient Room Tax Ordinance" imposes a 
tax upon "occupancy" of a suite, room or rooms. That 
the tax is assessed upon the occupant and not the land-
lord is further indicated by section 4, which provides, 
in part: '"There shall be excluded from the rent paid 
or charged by which the tax is measured: ... " (Em-
phasis added) . 
Appellants cannot question the constitutionality 
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of the ordinance on the ground that it "imposes a tax 
on a minority of individuals" (Complaint, paragraph 
4) labelled "transients" (Appellants' Brief, p. 8) or 
because it taxes a "class of people who receive no bene-
fit therefrom" (i.e. "transient guests" - Appellants' 
Brief, P. 11) because appellants are not members of 
the "minority" allegedly injured. Appellants are op-
erators and not occupants. 
A person seeking to raise the question of the valid-
ity of a discriminatory statute has no standing for that 
purpose unless he belongs to the class which is preju-
diced by the statute. See: State vs. Candland, 36 Ut 
406. 104 P. 285; Garieb vs. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 71 L 
ed 1228, 47 S. Ct 675; Barrows vs. Jackson, 346 U.S. 
249, 97 L ed 1586, 73 S. Ct 1031. 
That the ordinance imposes upon appellants the 
"expense of collecting and maintaining records and 
accounting for the tax revenues" (Complaint, para-
graph 5) does not give appellants standing to attack 
the ordinance as unconstitutional. To have such stand-
ing, a taxpayer must show that he will sustain some 
direct injury. Doremus vs. Board of Education, 342 
U.S. 429, 96 L ed 475, 72 S. Ct 394. Such a challenge 
cannot be made on the ground that the rights of others 
will be impaired. See: Tileston vs. Ullman, 318 U.S. 
44, 87 L ed 603; Walgreen Co. vs. State Board of 
Equalization, 70 Wyo 193, 246 P 2d 767. 
The tax imposed by the ordinance is collected and 
accounted for and recor<ls are kept in conjunction with 
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the same records which plaintiffs now are keeping pur-
suant to both the State and local sales and use tax laws. 
The ordinance merely increases the percentage for 
which plaintiffs must collect and account from 3.5 per 
cent to 5 per cent. If appellants are to achieve standing 
on the basis of this argument they must convince the 
Court that it is more difficult to multiply by 5 than it 
is to multiply by 3.5 and that this difficulty imposes a 
substantial burden upon them. 
It is clear that appellant has no standing in his 
representative capacity as President of the Motel As-
sociation since an unincorporated association has no 
standing to maintain an action in the name of the asso-
ciation. See: American Newspaper Guild vs. Mac-
li·in non, et al., 108 F. Supp. 312, Utah District Court; 
see also Northwestern Pennsylvania Automatic Phono-
graph Association vs. Meadville City, 359 Pa. 549, 50 
A 2d 907; Georgia Music Operators Association vs. 
Atlanta, 183 Ga 794, 190 S.E. 32 and 2 A.L.R. 917. 
It has not been contended by Menlove, that he, 
personally, stands to be injured in any way other than 
as the owner of short term rental premises. There is 
likewise no contention that he, in any capacity, ever 
made payment under protest, or for that matter, was, 
ever in fact, personally assessed or threatened with 
assessment under the provisions of the new ordinance. 
Respondent contends that, under such circum-
stauees, :Menlove does not qualify to contest the ordi-
nance on grounds that he, himself, might perhaps be, 
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under some stretch of the imagination, assessed under 
its provisions. Authority exists for the proposition that 
a taxpayer suit to restrain unconstitutional acts is avail-
able only to a party able to show that he has sustaine<l 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury, arising as the result of the enforcement of 
the challenged statute, from a violation of a legal right, 
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way, 
in common with people generally. Doremus vs. Board 
of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 96 Led 475, 72 S. Ct 394. 
In addition, it is to be noted that, if appellant 
had sought standing as a so-called "transient" rather 
thau as a motel owner, he must then have complied 
'vith the provisions of 59-11-11 and 59-15-12 U.C.A. 
1953, which provide the exclusive remedy for anyone 
genuinely interested in challenging the validity of taxes 
imposed within the State of Utah. See also: Shea vs. 
State Tax Commission, 101 U. 209, 120 P 2d 274 and 
P.I.E. vs. State Tax Commission, 7 U. 2d 15, 316 P 2d 
549. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lower Court's decision should be affirmed 
and respondents should be awarded costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
Attorney for Respondents 
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